The moral value of animals has become a prominent issue. Various theories have been offered to define the moral relation between humans and other animals, and in a more political context, various viewpoints are in conflict over how animals ought to be treated. At the core of the issue is individuality. Can animals be "individuals"? Can animals have individual moral value? Elisa Aaltola explores these questions on three levels: animal definitions, ethical theory, and context. Firstly, she analyses what type of ethical understandings common cultural definitions of animal have lead to, and whether definitions offered by cognitive ethology and the study of animal minds can shed some light on the issue of animal individuality. Secondly, various theories for and against the individual value of animals are analysed. Thirdly, the implications of animal individuality in the practical context of interest conflicts are investigated. Thus, animal individuality is explored through asking whether animals are and can be defined as individuals, whether they should be defined as such, and what the practical consequences would be. Aaltola maintains the "animal individuality" is not only a feasible concept, but also one that is necessary both in the ontological and the normative analyses concerning other animals.
Aaltola Elisa
The moral value of animals has become a prominent issue. Various theories have been offered to define the moral relation between humans and other animals, and in a more political context, various viewpoints are in conflict over how animals ought to be treated. At the core of the issue is individuality. Can animals be "individuals"? Can animals have individual moral value? Elisa Aaltola explores these questions on three levels: animal definitions, ethical theory, and context. Firstly, she analyses what type of ethical understandings common cultural definitions of animal have lead to, and whether definitions offered by cognitive ethology and the study of animal minds can shed some light on the issue of animal individuality. Secondly, various theories for and against the individual value of animals are analysed. Thirdly, the implications of animal individuality in the practical context of interest conflicts are investigated. Thus, animal individuality is explored through asking whether animals are and can be defined as individuals, whether they should be defined as such, and what the practical consequences would be. Aaltola maintains the "animal individuality" is not only a feasible concept, but also one that is necessary both in the ontological and the normative analyses concerning other animals.
Aaltola Elisa
